报告主题：专利延伸和收回监管对绿色药房的影响（The Effects of Patent Extension and Take-Back Regulation on Green Pharmacy）

报告时间：6月12日（周一）9:30

报告地点：延安路校区旭日楼306教室

主持人：沈滨 教授

报告人：史天琴 副教授

报告简介：

The eco-toxicity arising from unused pharmaceuticals has regulators advocating the benign design concept of “green pharmacy,” but high research and development expenses can be prohibitive. We therefore examine the impacts of two regulatory mechanisms, patent extension and take-back regulation, on inducing drug manufacturers to go green. One incentive suggested by the European Environmental Agency is a patent extension for a company that redesigns its already patented pharmaceutical to be more environmentally friendly. This incentive can encourage both the development of degradable drugs and the disclosure of technical information. Yet, it is unclear how effective the extension would be in inducing green pharmacy and in maximizing social welfare.  We develop a game-theoretic model in which an innovative company collects monopoly profits for a patented pharmaceutical but faces competition from a generic rival after the patent expires. A social-welfare-maximizing regulator is the Stackelberg leader. The regulator leads by offering a patent extension to the innovative company while also imposing take-back regulation on the pharmaceutical industry. Then the two-profit maximizing companies respond by setting drug prices and choosing whether to invest in green pharmacy. The regulator’s optimal patent extension offer can induce green pharmacy but only if the offer exceeds athreshold length that depends on the degree of product differentiation present in the pharmaceutical industry. The regulator’s correspondingly optimal take-back regulation generally prescribes a required collection rate that decreases as its optimal patent extension offer increases, and vice versa. By isolating green pharmacy as a potential target to address pharmaceutical eco-toxicity at its source, the regulatory policy that we consider, which combines the incentive inherent in earning a patent extension on the one hand with the penalty inherent in complying with take-back regulation on the other hand, serves as a useful starting point for policymakers to optimally balance economic welfare considerations with environmental stewardship considerations.

报告人简介：

史天琴博士是美国圣何塞州立大学副教授。她在伊利诺伊大学香槟分校获得运营管理博士学位，上海交通大学管理科学与工程硕士学位及数学学士学位。史博士的研究兴趣包括可持续运营管理和智能供应链管理。她的出版物发表在《制造与服务运营管理》、《生产和运营管理》、《决策科学》、《运筹学年鉴》、《运输研究E部分》和《国际生产研究杂志》等期刊上。