20201222天津大学张建雄教授学术报告
发布人:周莉莉  发布时间:2020-12-11   浏览次数:139

报告题目:Strategic overcapacity in live-streaming platform selling

报告时间:周二(1222日)上午9:30

报告地点: 旭日楼306

报告人:张建雄 教授


报告人简介:

张建雄, 天津大学管理与经济学部系统工程研究所教授、博士生导师。主要研究方向为企业运营管理、复杂系统建模与决策。入选2019中国高被引学者(决策科学领域)。已在 EJOR, JOTA, Omega, IEEE Transactions.Neural Computation, Pattern Recognition, Biological Cybernetics等国际知名杂志上发表期刊论文100余篇。谷歌学术显示论文总被引近1800次,H指数为23。现主持国家自然科学基金面上项目1项。主持完成国家自然科学基金项目2项、教育部博士学科点新教师基金和教育部人文社会科学基金各1项。参与完成教育部“长江学者和创新团队发展计划”项目和国家自然科学基金项目各1 项。2011 年获得“教育部新世纪优秀人才”称号。2012 年获得天津大学“北洋青年学者”称号。协助指导的博士生郑鹏升获得2012年全国百篇优秀博士论文提名奖。获得2014年教育部自然科学奖二等奖(排名第四)。任美国《数学评论》(Mathematical Reviews) 评论员。担任Emerald国际杂志Journal of Modelling in Management Associate Editor


报告简介:

We study the capacity investment strategy of a manufacturer who sells his product on a live-streaming shopping platform. The manufacturer first decides the production capacity, then the platform decides her commission, and finally the manufacturer sets the retail price. The platform has an informational advantage about the product demand due to proximity to the market and accessibility to the sales data of similar products. The manufacturer without a direct access to the demand information tries to infer it from the commission decision of the platform, which results in a signaling game. Interestingly, the manufacturer may strategically install a strictly higher capacity than any demand to be realized. The overcapacity also benefits the manufacturer by driving down the commission charged by the platform when observing a small market potential due to the signaling effect.